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Abstract  
We introduce seven new versions of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) classical physical secure 
key exchange scheme. While these practical improvements offer progressively enhanced security and/or speed 
for the non-ideal conditions, the fundamental physical laws providing the security remain the same.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this section we briefly define our basic terms of secure key exchange utilizing the laws of 
physics and introduce the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange 
protocol. 
 
1.1 Conditional, Unconditional, Perfectly and Imperfectly secure key exchange 
 
In private-key based secure communication, the two parties Alice (A) and Bob (B) possess an 
identical secure key, which is not known to the public, and they utilizing this key in a cipher 
software to encrypt/decrypt the messages they send/receive [1]. Thus, to able to communicate, 
Alice and Bob must first generate and share a secure key, which is typically a random bit 
sequence. The first important problem of secure communication is how to generate and share 
this key in a secure way between Alice and Bob. Note, even if Alice and Bob may already 
have shared a former secret key to communicate securely and they maybe able to share a new 
key via that secure communication, that is not a security-growing method because, if the old 
key is cracked by an eavesdropper (Eve), the new key will also become compromised 
implying that such a simple method cannot be used to share the new key. Of course, Alice and 
Bob may exchange a secure key by personally meeting or using a mail courier service 
however that is not satisfactory for high speed. Today's internet-based secure communication 
uses software tools to generate and share secure keys where the reason why Eve (who is 
monitoring the channel) cannot extract the key due to her limited computational performance. 
However, the whole information about the secure key is there in the communication during 
the key exchange [1]. Thus, these methods offer only conditional security because, with 
sufficient computing power (for example by having a hypothetical quantum computer or its 
noise-based-logic version), the key would instantaneously be cracked by Eve. Due to the 
unexpected progression of computing technologies, this type of security is not only 
conditional but also it is not a future-proof-security [2]: Eve can potentially crack the 
recorded key exchange and communication in the near future even if presently such task looks 
hopeless.  
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Due to these facts, scientists have been exploring various physical phenomena for secure 
key exchange where the laws of physics could offer the security. The goal is to have a key 
exchange where either the exchange cannot be measured/recorded, or when the useful 
information measured/recorded by Eve is zero; a situation called perfect information theoretic 
security; or this information is practically miniscule, a situation that is called imperfect perfect 
information theoretic security. If the extracted information by Eve is zero or small and, its 
amount does not depend on Eve's accessible resources when if she is approaching the limits 
imposed by the laws of physics, the security is called unconditional [2,3]. Thus the security 
classification can be perfect unconditional or imperfect unconditional. In practical cases 
"unconditional" and "information theoretic" security are interchangeable terms [2]. Perfect 
unconditional security can be reached only at the conceptual level in any physical system 
while the imperfect unconditional security is the one that any practical physical system can 
reach due to the limitations posed by non-ideal elements and situations [2,3]. 
 
1.2 The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme 
 
The KLJN scheme is a statistical/physical competitor to quantum communicators and its 
security is based on Kirchhoff’s Loop Law and the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. More 
generally, it is founded on the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which indicates that the 
security of the ideal scheme is as strong as the impossibility to build a perpetual motion 
machine of the second kind. 
Until 2005, it was a commonly accepted that only quantum key distribution (QKD) is able to 
perform information theoretic (unconditional) secure key exchange and that can theoretically 
provide perfect security while practically it is always imperfect. However, in 2005, the 
Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange [2-16] scheme was 
introduced [4] and later it was built and its security demonstrated [7]. These ideas have 
inspired new concepts also in computing, particularly noise-based logic and computing [17-
24], where not the security of data but complexity of data processing has been the issue.  
The core KLJN system, without the defense circuitry against invasive and non-ideality 
attacks, is show in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Outline of the core KLJN system. Parasitic elements leading to non-ideal features and defense circuit 
block (current/voltage monitoring/comparison) against invasive attack are not the topics of this paper thus they 
are not shown/discussed here. The resistors RA and RB are selected from the  
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We first briefly survey the foundations of the ideal KLJN system [2,4,9]. Fig. 1 shows a 
model of the idealized KLJN scheme designed for secure key exchange [4]. At each KLJN-
clock period, which is the duration of a single bit exchange, Alice and Bob connect their 
randomly chosen resistor, RA and RB, respectively, to the line. The resistors RA and RB are 
randomly selected of the set of {RL , RH}, RL ≠ RH , where the elements represent the low, L 
(0), and high, H (1), bits, respectively. Alice and Bob randomly choose one of the resistors 
and connect it to the wire line. The situations LH and HL represent secure bit exchange [4], 
because Eve cannot distinguish between them through measurements, while LL and HH are 
insecure. The Gaussian voltage noise generators—delivering white noise with publicly agreed 
bandwidth—represent an enhanced thermal (Johnson) noise at a publicly agreed effective 
temperature Teff  (typicallyTeff ≥109K  [7]) where their noises are statistically independent 
from each other or the noise during the former clock period. According to the Fluctuation-
Dissipation Theorem, the power density spectra Su ,L ( f )  and Su ,H ( f )  of the voltages UL ,A(t)  
and UL ,B(t)  supplied by the voltage generators in RL  and RH  are given by 
Su ,L ( f ) = 4kTeff RL   and   Su ,H ( f ) = 4kTeff RH ,                                      (1) 
respectively. 
In the case of secure bit exchange (i.e., the LH or HL situation), the power density spectrum 
S( f )  and the mean-square amplitude Uch2  of the channel voltage Uch (t)  and the same 
measures of the channel current Ich (t)  are given as 
Uch2 = Δf Su ,ch ( f ) = 4kTeff RLRHRL + RH  Δf
 ,                        (2) 
and      
Ich2 = Δf  Si,ch (t) = 4kTeffRL + RH Δf  ,        (3) 
respectively, where Δf  is the noise-bandwidth; and further details are given elsewhere [4,9]. 
It should be observed that during the LH and HL cases, due to the linear superposition, the 
spectrum given by Eq. (2) represents the sum of the spectra at two particular situations, i.e., 
when only the noise generator of   RL  is running one gets  
SL ,u ,ch ( f ) = 4kTeff RL
RH
RL + RH
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
        ,                         (4) 
and when the noise generator of   RH  is running one has  
SH ,u ,ch ( f ) = 4kTeff RH
RL
RL + RH
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
 .                                        (5) 
The ultimate security of the system against passive attacks is provided by the fact that the 
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power PH→L , by which the Johnson noise generator of resistor RH  is heating resistor RL , is 
equal to the power PL→H  by which the Johnson noise generator of resistor RL  is heating 
resistor RH  [4,9]. Thus the net power flow between Alice and Bob is zero, which is required 
by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. A proof of this can easily be derived from Eqs. (4,5) 
for the noise-bandwidth of Δf  :  
PL→H =
SL ,u ,ch ( f )Δf
RH
= 4kTeff
RLRH
(RL + RH )2
 ,                                                  (6a) 
and              
PH→L =
SH ,u ,ch ( f )Δf
RL
= 4kTeff
RLRH
(RL + RH )2
 .        (6b) 
Violating the equality PH→L = PL→H  (cf. Eq. (6)) is in accordance with the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics; violating this equality would mean not only going against basic laws of 
physics (the inability to build a perpetual motion machine) but also allow Eve to use the 
voltage-current cross-correlation Uch (t)Ich (t)  to extract the bit [4]. However the only 
quantity that could provide directional information is zero, Uch (t)Ich (t) = 0 , and hence Eve 
has no information to determine the bit location during the LH and HL situations. The above 
security proof against passive (listening) attacks holds only for Gaussian noise, which has the 
well-known property that its power density spectrum or autocorrelation function already 
provides the maximum achievable information about the noise, and no higher order 
distribution functions or other tools (such as higher-order statistics) are able to serve with 
additional information. 
Finally, the error probability of the bit exchange between Alice and Bob is determined by the 
following issue. In the case of the LL bit status of Alice and Bob, which is not secure 
situation, the channel voltage and current satisfy: 
Uch2 = Δf Su ,ch ( f ) = 4kTeff RL2  Δf  and    Ich
2 = Δf  Si,ch (t) = 2kTeffRL Δf   ,  (7) 
while, in the case of the other non-secure situation, the HH bit status, the channel voltage and 
current satisfy: 
Uch2 = Δf Su ,ch ( f ) = 4kTeff RH2  Δf  and    Ich
2 = Δf  Si,ch (t) = 2kTeffRH Δf    (8) 
During key exchange in this classical way, Alice and Bob must compare the predictions of 
Eqs. (2,3,7,8) with the actually measured mean-square channel voltage and current to decide 
if the situation is secure (LH or HL) while utilizing the fact that these mean-square values are 
different in each these three situations (LL, LH/HL and HH). If the situation is secure, Alice 
and Bob will know that the other party has the inverse of his/her bit, which means, a secure 
key exchange takes place. To make an error-free key exchange, Alice and Bob must use a 
sufficiently large statistics, which means long-enough clock period. However, the length of 
  5 
the clock period determines also the speed of the key exchange and Eve's statistics when 
utilizing non-ideal features to extract information. Thus new protocols that can reduce the 
necessary clock period for satisfactory statistics enhance not only speed but also security. The 
new ("intelligent") KLJN protocol described in Sec. 2 offers this kind of improvement. 
 
1.3 On invasive attacks and non-idealities  
 
It should be observed [2,3,4,6,9,10,11,12] that deviations from the shown circuitry—
including invasive attacks by Eve, parasitic elements, delay effects, inaccuracies, non-
Gaussianity of the noise, etc.—will cause a potential information leak toward Eve. The circuit 
symbol “line” in the circuitry represents an ideal wire with uniform instantaneous voltage and 
current along it. Fortunately the KLJN system is very simple, implying that the number of 
such attacks is strongly limited. The defense method against attacks utilizing these aspects is 
straightforward and it is generally based on the comparison of instantaneous voltage and 
current data at the two ends but authenticated communication between Alice and Bob.  
These attacks are not subject of the present paper and we refer to our relevant papers where 
they have been correctly analyzed [2,3,4,6,9,10,11,12] and misconceptions in other papers 
rectified. In surveys [2,3], existing invasive attacks by other authors and us have been 
surveyed.  
It is important to emphasize that, if the security of a certain bit is compromised, that is known 
also by Alice and Bob therefore they can decide to discard the bit to have a clean secure key. 
The price is the speed of key exchange however the unconditional security can be maintained. 
A consequence: Alice and Bob can always protect themselves against eavesdropping but they 
are still vulnerable against jamming the KLJN key exchange by Eve (the same situation exists 
with QKD at its best).  
 
2. The "intelligent" KLJN (iKLJN) key exchange protocol 
 
The important conclusion of all attack types against practical KLJN systems is that Eve’s bit-
guessing success rate is strongly limited by poor statistics [4,6,9,10,11,12] and signal-to-noise 
ratio due to the limited clock period, which is the time window to make that statistics [11,12] 
and typically extract a DC signal (such as differences between the mean-square voltages at the 
two ends of the line) that forms the information in a large noise. Thus, if we could further 
limit Eve’s time window her success rate would further decrease. As we have already pointed 
out above, the minimum duration of the clock period in the original KLJN scheme is set by 
Alice and Bob because of their need to successfully classify the measured mean-square 
channel voltage and/or current levels and by comparing them with the predictions of Eqs. 
(2,3,7,8), identify that which one of the LL, LH/HL, HH situations do they correspond [4].  
 
 The Intelligent KLJN (iKLJN) system allows using shorter clock period thus it further 
weakens Eve's statistics. It has the same hardware as the original KLJN system but the 
protocol is more calculation-intensive. Alice and Bob utilize the fact that they exactly know 
not only their own resistor value but also the stochastic time function of their own noise, 
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which they generate before feeding it into the loop. In the iKLJN method, Alice and Bob, by 
utilizing the superposition theorem on the channel noise, subtract their own contribution to 
generate a reduced-channel-noise that does not contain their own noise component. Because 
they don't know the resistance value at the other end, they must run two alternative 
computational-schemes simultaneously to calculate reduced-channel-noises to account for the 
possible resistance situations of (totally four time functions, two voltage and two current 
noises corresponding to the two possible resistance situations at the other end), see below. 
Then they analyze that at which one of these situations the reduced-channel-noise does not 
contain their noise contribution. The reduced-channel-noise that does not contain their noise 
component has been calculated with the correct assumption about the actual resistance value 
used by the other party. Thus the nature of the decision Alice and Bob makes has changed: 
instead of evaluating mean-square noise amplitudes, they must assess the independence of 
two noise processes. Note, obviously they continue to assess the channel noise situation also 
in the classical way by evaluating the mean-square of the cannel noise amplitudes, which has 
partially independent information, thus combining the new and old information sources in the 
guessing process significantly shortens the clock period needed for a given error probability. 
At the same time, Eve can only use her old way, the parasitic elements to extract any 
information. Because Eve's available observation time window (the clock period set by Alice 
and Bob) becomes shorter, the information that she can extract is also significantly reduced. 
She may not even be sure during the shortened clock period if a secure bit exchange took 
place, or not, her related error rate will increase. Thus, in the non-ideal situation, when 
information-leak exists, the reduced observation time window progressively worsens Eve's 
probability of successfully guessing not only the key bits but also guessing which clock 
periods had secure bit exchange. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Snapshot of the current and voltages in the KLJN system: at the given time moment the polarities of 
Alice's and Bob's voltages and the resulting current is shown.  
 
2.1 Analysis of the "intelligent" KLJN (iKLJN) key exchange protocol 
 
To analyze the system with this new approach and to illustrate its working, first, let us assume 
that Bob's resistance is RB  and Alice's one is: 
RA =αRB            (9) 
UA UB
RA RB
Uc
Alice Bob
+ (-)
- (+)
+ (-)
- (+)
Ic
  7 
where α ≠ 1 . We analyze Bob's protocol and its results to demonstrate the process. Alice is 
acting in a similar way, which results in the same type of features. 
 
According to Kirchhoff's Loop Law, the channel noise current Ic(t)  and noise voltage Uc(t)  
at a given instant of time are given as: 
Ic =
UB −UA
RB 1+α( )           (10) 
Uc =
UA +αUB
1+α   ,         (11) 
where, for convenience, we skipped the time variable from the equations. Bob's calculation of 
the reduced-channel-noise currents and voltages takes place in the following way. 
 
???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
 
In one of the computational-schemes, Bob supposes that the resistance value of Alice is the 
same as his one, that is, RA = RB  , which is the incorrect assumption. Then the "incorrect" 
reduced-channel-current and reduced-channel-voltage amplitudes, Ic,1*  and Uc,1*  , are: 
Ic,1* = Ic − UB2RB =
UB −UA
RB 1+α( ) −
UB
2RB
= − 1RB
2UA −UB 1−α( )
2 1+α( )     (12) 
Uc,1* =Uc −UB2 =
UA +αUB
1+α −
UB
2 =
2UA −UB 1−α( )
2 1+α( )      (13) 
 
???????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
 
In the other computational-scheme, Bob supposes that the resistance value of Alice is 
different than his one, that is, RA =αRB  , which is the correct assumption. Then the "correct" 
reduced-channel-current and reduced-channel-voltage amplitudes, Ic,2*  and Uc,2*  , are: 
Ic,2* = Ic − UBRB 1+α( ) =
UB −UA
RB 1+α( ) −
UB
RB 1+α( ) =
−UA
RB 1+α( )      (14) 
Uc,2* =Uc − αUB1+α =
UA +αUB
1+α −
αUB
α +1 =
UA
1+α       (15) 
It is obvious from our approach and the results in Eqs (12-15) that, in the case of the incorrect 
assumption, the reduced-channel-noises contain both the noise contribution of Alice (UA(t) ) 
and that of Bob (UB(t) ) while, in the case of the incorrect assumption, they contain the noise 
of Alice (UA(t) ) only. Thus, Bob, by using proper statistical tool to compare the reduced-
channel-noises with his own noise (UB(t) ) and checking for the independence, he can identify 
the "correct" assumption and, by this, learn the actual resistor value of Alice. One of the 
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simplest ways to do this is checking the cross-correlations between his noise and the reduced- 
channel-noises: 
 
With the incorrect assumption: 
UBIc,1* =
UB2 1−α( )
2 1+α( )RB ≠ 0          (16) 
UBUc,1* =
UB2 α −1( )
2 1+α( ) ≠ 0          (17) 
With the correct assumption: 
UBIc,2* =
− UAUB
RB 1+α( ) = 0          
(18) 
UBUc,2* =
UAUB
1+α = 0          (19) 
While evaluating and comparing the above cross-correlations is an independent source of 
information for Bob about Alice's resistance; in the field of statistics there are more powerful 
ways of estimations, which are planned to be explored.  
Naturally, Alice is proceeding in the same way as Bob. Then combining even the above 
simple crosscorrelation analysis with the original assessments based on the voltage and 
current noises will significantly enhance the information of Alice and Bob, and thus they can 
use shorter clock-period to reach the same error probability as earlier. And, because Eve does 
not have access to the "intelligent" way of information extraction, her successful guessing 
probability of the resistor situation in the non-ideal KLJN system will drop significantly, 
while in the ideal system her information is still zero. Moreover, due to the reduction of clock 
duration, also Eve's error probability will increase about guessing if a secure bit exchange 
took place or not, which further enhances her uncertainty. 
 
Finally, an important question: What is the price of this "intelligent" enhancement of the 
original KLJN protocol? A higher computational capacity is needed for Alice and Bob to 
carry out this task, which implies higher electrical power requirements, too. Thus, when 
computational performance is limited or low power requirements are essential, the classical 
KLJN (and its keyed version, see below) is the way to go with a corresponding slower speed. 
 
3. An educational problem about the KLJN system 
 
This section is not essential for the rest of the paper thus Readers who are not interested in the 
deeper understanding of the foundations of the KLJN system can jump to the next section. 
The natural question arises about the iKLJN theory. Do we need statistical evaluation or 
perhaps we could already determine the correct assumption by just using the reduced voltage 
and current values? Similar questions arose in 2005 before Johnson (-like) noise was 
introduced into the KLJN system and a random DC voltage generator pair version of it was 
explored. The answer was that Johnson noise and statistical analysis were needed. That study 
was unpublished and, we will now show that the similar situation in the iKLJN system leads 
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to the same conclusion; statistics cannot be avoided. 
If we use Ohm's law between the correctly deduced reduced-channel-voltage and reduced-
channel-current components, we get
 Uc,1*
Ic,1*
= − 1RB
  ,           (20) 
which is the expected result where the negative sign is due to the direction of current 
component into Bobs resistor from Alice's voltage generator, see Fig 2. 
Our naive expectation can be that, if we do the same derivation with the incorrectly deduced 
current and voltage components then the result will be different and then Bob can 
instantaneously find out that Hypothesis-2 is the valid assumption for Alice's resistor. 
Unfortunately, even the incorrect assumption yields the same result:  
Uc,2*
Ic,2*
= − 1RB
           (21) 
This surprising result is due to the degeneracy of the system of equations describing the 
channel voltage and current, which also prohibits for Bob to deduce Alice's resistor even 
though he knows his resistor and voltage (a situation that led the author in 2005 to test 
thermal noise in this system). No "simultaneous" way to find out Alice's resistance, that is α , 
exists due to this degeneracy. In conclusion, only statistical methods can provide the 
necessary information for Bob.  
 
4. The "multiple" KLJN (MKLJN) key exchange protocol 
 
 In the "multiple" KLJN (MKLJN) system, Alice and Bob have publicly known identical 
sets of different resistors R1 < R2 < ...< Rn{ } . For each clock period, they randomly choose a 
resistor from this set and connect it (with a corresponding independent noise generator) to the 
line. There is a publicly known truth table about the bit-interpretation of the different 
combinations of the chosen Ri ,Rj⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  resistor pair, whenever Ri ≠ Rj , so that the bit 
interpretation of Ri ,Rj⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  is the inverse of the bit interpretation of Rj ,Ri⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ . It is designed so 
that, when the estimation of one of the resistors is missed at one of the sides and the 
neighboring resistor value is estimated instead, the bit-interpretation reverses in order to make 
Eve's guessing statistics worse.  
 
In this new situation, for Eve to succeed, it is not enough to find out which end has the higher 
resistor. Eve must exactly identify the actual resistor values at both sides (while Alice and Bob 
only at the other side) to know that which Ri ,Rj⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ / Rj ,Ri⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  situation is the relevant in the 
truth table and, in accordance with the original KLJN principle, even then Eve is unable to 
decide if Ri ,Rj⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  or Rj ,Ri⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  is the case. The result of modification is again an enhanced 
security in the non-ideal case. 
 
5. The "keyed" KLJN (KKLJN) key exchange protocol 
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This enhancement is inspired by Horace Yuen's "keyed" quantum key exchange (called KCQ) 
[25] to enhance the security of his new quantum key exchange protocol. This works after a 
secure key is already generated/shared by Alice and Bob in the KLJN protocol. Then, by 
using secure communication with the shared key, they share a time-dependent truth table for 
the bit-interpretation of the RL ,RH[ ]i  versus RH ,RL[ ]i  resistor situation at the i-th secure bit 
exchange step during generating the next key (note, the RL ,RH[ ]i  and RH ,RL[ ]i  situations 
must always mean opposite bit values). 
 
It is obvious that KKLJN is a security growing technique because, even if Eve succeeds with 
correctly guessing the former key, the security of the new key is still information theoretical 
(unconditional) and it only "falls back" to the security level of the original KLJN key 
exchange. If Eve has no information about the former key, the information of Eve about the 
key is progressively less. 
 
6. The "keyed multiple" KLJN (KMKLJN) key exchange protocol 
 
Naturally, the KKLJN protocol can be enriched by using multiple resistor sets, n > 2 , with 
the same fashion as the MKLJN system is doing but, instead of a publicly known truth table 
the bit-interpretation of the RL ,RH[ ]i  versus RH ,RL[ ]i  resistor situations is randomly changed 
for sharing the new key and the relevant truth table is shared by secure communication 
utilizing the former key. The KMKLJN protocol synergically combines the security 
enhancement of the KMLJN and KKLJN protocols. 
 
7. Three more protocols:  iMKLJN, iKKLJN and iKMKLJN 
 
The "mutiple", "keyed" and "keyed multiple" protocols can be combined with the "intelligent" 
method of accessing the resistors at the other end by Alice and Bob to reduce the clock 
duration and Eve's information, and to increase the speed. This enrichment should always be 
made whenever calculation power is enough. The resulting new protocols are iMKLJN, 
iKKLJN and iKMKLJN. 
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